一篇为中国发声的印度报观点

本篇文章英文水平很深，我自己也不是看得很明白。但是感觉出印度也良心发现了，美国通过芯片打压中国，这位印度编辑也看不过眼。

印象深刻的是他说了一句：这印证了中国人所言不虚：“西方可以帮忙中国崛起，但是不能好过西方。”

谁可以翻译一下？


US sanctions targeting China’s semiconductor industry are a gamble aimed at maintaining American hegemony

It is widely believed that the neoliberal global order based on open economies, reciprocal gains from trade, free flows of finance, elite mobility, and faith in interdependence is now ending. One can pick any moment as marking its end. The Biden administration’s slew of tough export regulations targeting China’s semiconductor industry is as good a marker as any. But what will replace that neoliberal world is not a social-democratic fantasy reorienting politics towards global public goods or justice. It is an even more militarised world, now less capable of trade and diplomacy, hurtling towards a conflict all the principal actors think they can calibrate and control.

The rise of China was always going to be a challenge; an authoritarian, opaque militarised China, relying on strident nationalism for legitimacy even more so. There are no easy options here. There is no way of confidently knowing what strategy would work. But the ideological framing of the American sanctions is striking. As Jake Sullivan put it: “We previously maintained a sliding scale approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. This is not the strategic environment in which we are today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.”

At one level, this statement expresses the unexceptional desire to be competitive. But in the context in which it was uttered, it has huge ramifications. For one thing, it has now expanded the pretext on which sanctions can be imposed: There is no casus belli here, no gesture at securing a global public good. The justification is maintaining American hegemony, pure and simple. There are gestures towards working with allies, and some countries might harbour the hopes of opportunistically benefitting from these sanctions. But the far-reaching nature of these sanctions will have implications for the reliability of the global trading and financial order. They express the crudest kind of mercantile reordering of the world system possible. In a curious way, the US is now fusing corporate and state power in ways that will resemble China.

Second, announcing these sanctions just before the Party Congress was a gesture that was designed to humiliate the Chinese. And it is equally hard to imagine that there will not be Chinese retaliation of some kind, perhaps on products that might have more play in American domestic politics. It is tempting to send a strong signal to the Chinese regime. But if you look at it from the point of view of the rest of the world, the framing is nothing but neo-colonial. It is saying something like “our objective is to ensure that one-fifth of humanity (and the rest of the world) always stays at least a couple of generations behind”. By openly declaring a war of supremacy, the options for diplomacy or subtle backing down are foreclosed. There is no attempt even to frame a non-zero-sum game solution here.

This framing also has consequences for partnerships. The West overestimates the support it has outside of Europe. China may be a threat to Taiwan and aspire to pre-eminence in Asia, but it is hard for the rest of the world to forget the litany of global violence and racial hierarchy that has taken place under the aegis of the American and Russian empires. The legitimacy of the order that the Americans seek to maintain will not be enhanced by mercantilist rather than global public good justifications. While thwarting Chinese revisionism of the global order, Americans are doing revisions of their own. It is also not entirely obvious how different countries will be able to leverage China-US rivalry to their strategic advantage as decoupling increases. But the world is also sceptical that the US will meaningfully transfer technology and finance that will address the world’s development needs. It is as likely that as China decouples, it doubles down on BRI and other initiatives.

Third, at the very least these sanctions are a recipe for creating immense uncertainty in global supply chains. Some countries, like India, may be salivating at the prospect of opportunistically gaining from this moment. But it is likely that these gains can be hugely diminished by the cumulative uncertainties in the world trading system. China is too important to isolate.

Fourth, it is clear that the principal arena where global cooperation is required, climate change, is on the back burner. It is difficult to imagine concerted global action on climate change while the superpowers are in a mercantilist war. The US has domestically taken massive steps to invest in tech solutions to climate change. But, as is the case with US pharma and vaccines, the jury is out on whether these investments are entirely in the service of technological supremacy or will also be converted into global public goods.

Fifth, the strategic consequences of these sanctions are not clear. The Chinese calculus on invading Taiwan will be determined by military assessments of the prospects of success. Does slowing down the semiconductor industry in the short run do anything to change those assessments? What consequences does it have for Chinese technology development? It may not be at the cutting edge, but can its domestic industry develop enough?

These sanctions are a big gamble, and the jury is out on their consequences. But something about their framing does not bode well for the world. For one thing, these sanctions are as close as you can come to a declaration of war without actual fighting. They also confirm every Chinese claim about the West: The West may have aided China’s rise (initially for opportunistic reasons during the Cold War), but it will try and put a ceiling on their growth. The point is not whether the Chinese or the Americans are right. The point is they now seem to be locked into an over-determined ideological construct, realist hegemonism on the one hand, and strident nationalist revisionism on the other. This construct has no room for politics, diplomacy or trade.

If the Chinese are going nationalist, surely the world will not be safer by a doubling down on American nationalism. If the world is facing an economic and ecological crisis, surely the answer cannot be a late-19th century striving for national supremacy. The rest of the world’s interest will lie not in opportunistically exploiting this rivalry but in banding together to change the self-defeating terms in which it is being conducted. The world is in a very dangerous place.

The writer is contributing editor, The Indian Express

（https://indianexpress.com/articl ... n-hegemony-8219494/）

美国制裁中国半导体产业是一场旨在维护美国霸权的赌博

人们普遍认为，基于开放经济、贸易互惠收益、金融自由流动、精英流动和相互依存信念的新自由主义全球秩序正在结束。人们可以选择任何时刻作为其结束的标志。拜登政府针对中国半导体行业的一系列严厉出口法规是一个很好的标志。但是，将取代新自由主义世界的不是社会民主幻想，将政治重新定位于全球公共产品或正义。这是一个更加军事化的世界，现在在贸易和外交方面的能力有所下降，正朝着所有主要参与者都认为他们可以校准和控制的冲突冲进。

中国的崛起总是一个挑战；一个专制、不透明的军事化中国，更依赖于尖锐的民族主义来获得合法性。这里没有简单的选择。没有办法自信地知道哪种策略会奏效。但美国制裁的意识形态框架令人震惊。正如 Jake Sullivan 所说：“我们之前一直采用滑动比例方法，即我们只需要保持领先几代。这不是我们今天所处的战略环境。鉴于某些技术的基础性质，例如高级逻辑和存储芯片，我们必须尽可能保持领先优势。”

在一个层面上，这句话表达了具有竞争力的非凡愿望。但在它发出的语境中，它产生了巨大的影响。一方面，它现在扩大了实施制裁的借口：这里没有开战理由，也没有确保全球公共利益的姿态。理由是维护美国霸权，纯粹而简单。有与盟友合作的姿态，一些国家可能怀有机会主义地从这些制裁中受益的希望。但这些制裁的深远性质将对全球贸易和金融秩序的可靠性产生影响。它们表达了对世界体系可能进行的最粗暴的商业重组。奇怪的是，美国现在正在以类似于中国的方式融合企业和国家权力。

其次，在党代会前宣布这些制裁是一种旨在羞辱中国人的姿态。同样很难想象中国不会进行某种形式的报复，也许是针对可能在美国国内政治中发挥更大作用的产品。向中国政权发出强烈信号是很有诱惑力的。但如果你从世界其他地方的角度来看，它的框架只不过是新殖民主义。它说的是“我们的目标是确保五分之一的人类（以及世界其他地区）总是至少落后几代人”。通过公开宣战至高无上的战争，外交或微妙退缩的选择被排除在外。这里甚至没有尝试构建一个非零和博弈的解决方案。

这种框架也对伙伴关系产生影响。西方高估了它在欧洲以外的支持。中国可能对台湾构成威胁，并渴望在亚洲占据主导地位，但世界其他地区很难忘记在美国和俄罗斯帝国的庇护下发生的一连串全球暴力和种族等级制度。美国人寻求维持的秩序的合法性不会因重商主义而非全球公共利益的正当理由而得到加强。在挫败中国对全球秩序的修正主义的同时，美国人也在做自己的修正。随着脱钩的加剧，不同国家将如何利用中美竞争来发挥其战略优势也不是很明显。但世界也怀疑美国是否会有意义地转让能够满足世界发展需求的技术和资金。随着中国脱钩，它很可能会在“一带一路”和其他倡议上加倍努力。

第三，至少这些制裁是在全球供应链中造成巨大不确定性的秘诀。一些国家，如印度，可能对从这一刻获得机会的前景垂涎三尺。但这些收益很可能会因世界贸易体系中累积的不确定性而大大减少。中国太重要了，不能孤立。

第四，很明显，需要全球合作的主要领域——气候变化，被搁置了。很难想象当超级大国处于重商主义战争中时，全球会针对气候变化采取协调一致的行动。美国已在国内采取大规模措施投资应对气候变化的技术解决方案。但是，与美国制药和疫苗的情况一样，这些投资是完全服务于技术霸权还是也将转化为全球公共产品，尚无定论。

第五，这些制裁的战略后果尚不明确。中国对入侵台湾的考量将取决于军方对成功前景的评估。短期内放慢半导体行业的速度是否会改变这些评估？它对中国技术发展有什么影响？它可能不是最前沿的，但它的国内产业能发展得足够吗？

这些制裁是一场豪赌，陪审团对其后果尚无定论。但关于他们的框架的某些事情对世界来说并不是一个好兆头。一方面，这些制裁与没有实际战斗的宣战一样接近。他们还证实了中国人对西方的每一个说法：西方可能帮助了中国的崛起（最初是出于冷战期间的机会主义原因），但它会试图限制他们的增长。关键不在于中国人或美国人是否正确。关键是他们现在似乎陷入了一种过度确定的意识形态结构，一方面是现实主义霸权主义，另一方面是尖锐的民族主义修正主义。这种结构没有政治、外交或贸易的空间。

如果中国人走向民族主义，加倍强调美国民族主义，世界肯定不会更安全。如果世界正面临经济和生态危机，答案肯定不可能是 19 世纪末期的国家霸权。世界其他国家的利益将不在于机会主义地利用这种竞争，而在于联合起来改变其进行时弄巧成拙的条款。世界处于一个非常危险的地方。

作者是《印度快报》特约编辑

老美就是见不得别的国家超过它，霸权主义思维作祟。

simonzhd 发表于 2022-10-22 09:07
老美就是见不得别的国家超过它，霸权主义思维作祟。

嗯嗯，是的。

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本来这篇转发的文章要删除了，可是超过10分钟了来不及了。

还有前几天的人格分裂、妄想和幻听的话题的自述，很后悔说了出来，可是又编辑不到了。

虽然如此，不能在10分钟过后删除也有它的好处的。